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Abstract: In this paper we examine how international development assistance for environmental 
purposes is allocated to developing countries.  In particular, we investigate whether there are 
patterned differences between environmental aid for international public goods projects versus 
environmental projects having more localized impacts.  We empirically investigate these 
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  Why do donors provide environmental aid to developing countries?   What are the effects 
of this particular type of development assistance?  Since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, scholars 
and policy analysts have spilled much ink over the causes and consequences of environmental 
assistance to developing countries. Yet the study of environmental assistance remains 
impressionistic and often based on qualitative case studies in small-n samples, thus limiting the 
prospects for a progressive accumulation of knowledge.  One reason our collective knowledge 
about environmental aid remains limited is the lack of reliable project-level data that is necessary 
for testing many of the provocative hypotheses in the literature. We seek to rectify these 
shortcomings by collecting, coding, and analyzing a new database (PLAID) that covers thirty 
years of environmental aid data from 50 donors (bilateral and multilateral agencies) to more than 
190 recipient countries. Specifically, we attempt to make sense of previously irreconcilable 
debates about bilateral and multilateral environmental aid and test a number of new hypotheses 
gleaned from the growing literature on delegation to international organizations (IOs). 
The issue of environmental aid allocation is an important one because it speaks to a larger 
debate in the development literature on international public good (IPG) provision and aid 
effectiveness. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have witnessed a dramatic shift in the rhetoric 
of bilateral and multilateral aid donors. From world leaders like George W. Bush, Tony Blair, 
and Kofi Annan, all the way down to paper-shuffling bureaucrats at USAID, DFID, and the 
World Bank, the aid community now enthusiastically embraces increased IPG provision and aid 
effectiveness. The International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, established by the 
US Congress amidst heated debate in 2000 over $18 billion of additional funding to the 
International Monetary Fund, urged multilateral development banks (MDBs) to redouble their 
IPG efforts. In particular, its authors argued for a sharper focus on the “treatment of tropical   3 
diseases and AIDS, rational protection of environmental resources, tropical climate agricultural 
programs, development of management and regulatory practices, and inter-country 
infrastructure.”
2 G-7 Finance Ministers also underscored the need for ex ante conditionality in 
2000, calling upon “[MDBs to] emphasize a selective, quality-oriented approach rather than a 
quantity-oriented or profit-oriented one … [and] place [a] high priority on good governance.”
3 
Again, at the Genoa Summit in 2001, G-7 countries stressed that “[MDBs] main priorities … 
should be to fight infectious diseases, promote environmental improvement, facilitate trade, and 
support financial stability.” They also endorsed the idea that every MDB should “define more 
explicitly its role in the provision of [IPGs] on the basis of its comparative advantages.”  
Casual empiricism suggests that the rise of these two objectives is more than just talk. 
Western governments have created a Montreal Protocol Fund to protect the ozone layer, a Global 
Environmental Facility to deal with climate change, bio-diversity loss, the pollution of 
international waters, ozone depletion, persistent organic pollutants, and desertification, a Global 
Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, an Emergency Plan for AIDS relief, a Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, and a Millennium Challenge Account which 
depoliticizes the aid allocation process by rewarding poor countries based on their adoption of 
“sound economic policies” and “good governance.” Talk may be cheap, but the construction of 
all these novel aid delivery mechanisms is not.  In addition to these institutionalized mechanisms 
for IPG provision, aid is increasingly channeled to the developing world to prevent drug-
trafficking, fight terrorism, resolve financial crises, foster democracy, and promote peace in war-
torn regions. These seemingly “functional” interventions beg an important empirical question: 
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Are donors actually, or nominally, concerned with international public good provision and aid 
effectiveness?  
According to many scholars and citizen activists, aid agencies are the villains, rather than 
the heroes of development.
4 Aid packages are nominally designed for poverty reduction, 
environmental protection, and international financial stability, but when all is said and done, 
stated objectives are just that. They provide politically-convenient window dressing to obscure 
the donor’s actual purpose for giving aid. Donors’ shroud their real motivations for giving aid in 
secrecy because funds are primarily used to achieve geo-strategic and commercial aims.
5 
Marshaling evidence in support of this position is hardly difficult. In 2003, Turkey was 
promised extraordinary amounts of military and economic assistance in the run-up to the US 
invasion of Iraq. Pakistan and Uzbekistan were also rewarded generously for assisting US 
military efforts in Afghanistan. International financial institutions, which are in principle 
designed to provide collective goods like international financial stability, are also routinely 
“leveraged” by their most powerful shareholders when the geo-strategic stakes are high. For 
example, in 1998 Pakistan saw IMF loans disappear after testing a nuclear weapon in defiance of 
US wishes, and then suddenly reappear at the beginning of the war in Iraq. A leading analyst of 
international organizations also dismisses the World Bank as “a source of funds to be offered to 
US friends or denied to US enemies.”
6  According to this “dysfunctional” aid narrative, donors’ 
commercial goals also place strong constraints on the utility of IPG aid. Haggard and Moravcsik 
suggest that the West’s primary motivation for distributing $30-$40 billion of assistance to 
former Soviet bloc states was not democracy, economic growth, and environmental protection – 
the stated objectives – but “privatizable” benefits advantaging special interests in donor 
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countries. The same authors argue that “the lack of any coherent justification for the creation of 
the EBRD … [suggests] … it was an act of political symbolism rather than functional 
necessity.”
7  In this view, foreign aid bears little resemblance to its stated objectives, remains 
uncoordinated and rudderless, and has next to no effect on international public good provision. In 
the words of strange bedfellows like Jesse Helms and The Economist, giving aid is like pouring 
money “down a rathole.”
8  
To be sure, not all evidence for the dysfunctional aid narrative has been anecdotal. In an 
oft-cited quantitative study of aid, Alesina and Dollar “find considerable evidence that the 
pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations. An inefficient, 
economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically friendly to its 
former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with similar level of poverty, a 
superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony.” Subsequent econometric work has yielded 
similar conclusions.
9  
Yet curiously, foreign aid is also regularly credited with a number of spectacular success 
stories: the post-war reconstruction in Western Europe, the eradication of river blindness and 
smallpox, the Green Revolution, the introduction of family planning, and sharp, generalized 
increases in life expectancy rates.
10 More recently, scholars and policy makers have suggested 
that IPG aid can have a profound impact on actual IPG outcomes.
11 The Montreal Protocol 
Fund, for example, has helped secure virtually universal participation in an ozone regime that 
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“ensures … no developing country or transition economy can lose by being party to the 
agreement . . . [and] any country will lose by not signing.”
12 Side payments to developing 
countries also have been a crucial component of many other international efforts to protect the 
environment.
13 More telling still, Senator Jesse Helms, perhaps the most strident critic of foreign 
aid in the US Congress, performed an abrupt volte-face in 2002, insisting that Western 
taxpayers’ dollars would be well spent on preventing the transmission of HIV/AIDS worldwide. 
These competing narratives – one “functional,” the other “dysfunctional” – about IPG aid 
present us with an empirical puzzle. If the need for IPG provision is more pressing than ever and 
Western policy preferences are indeed coalescing around such issues, presumably we should 
observe patterned differences between IPG and non-IPG aid allocation and implementation 
outcomes. To discriminate between these competing narratives, we seek here to determine 
whether we can reject the null hypothesis that IPG and non-IPG aid allocation are governed by 
the same set of decision making criteria. To sharpen the analytical bite of our study, we 
triangulate on what many agree to be the archetypal international public good: environmental 
protection. 
Critics of this approach might argue that the empirical spotlight should be thrown on IPG 
and non-IPG implementation outcomes rather than allocation patterns. Careful studies of 
implementation are no doubt desirable, but we also mustn’t create an illusory divide between 
donors’ intentions at the allocation stage and their follow-up at the implementation stage of the 
aid giving process.   
If we can confirm that (some types of) donors are motivated primarily by the 
improvement of environmental protection overseas, then it also seems reasonable to assume 
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(such) donors will monitor recipient behavior through police-patrol and fire-alarm oversight 
mechanisms, employ procedural checks and balances, and rescind or re-negotiate contracts in 
cases of defection, backsliding, or some other failure to follow through on specific policy 
commitments (Nielson and Tierney 2003). In other words, donors that appear to be genuinely 
interested in environmental protection at the allocation stage (i.e. those who screen and select for 
worthy recipients) will presumably take steps to ensure that their aid dollars are also spent wisely 
at the project implementation stage. Hence, we test whether donors contract primarily with 
recipient governments that are willing and able to offer an attractive environmental “rate-of-
return” on donors’ aid investment. If this proposition can be confirmed, we argue we will be 
much closer to understanding how concerned donors are with aid effectiveness and IPG 
provision. 
  To be clear, the underlying assumption is that donors are actually, as opposed to 
nominally, concerned with both international public good provision and aid effectiveness. Since 
problems like moral hazard, adverse selection, fungibility, rent-seeking, credibility, and poor 
economic policies influence the environmental “rate of return” that donors will receive on their 
aid “investment,” we would expect allocation patterns – or the use of scarce taxpayer dollars – to 
reflect these concerns. If environmental aid flows mainly to countries of geo-strategic and 
commercial interest to donors, then we can conclude that our first-order assumptions about “eco-
functional” donor motivations are inappropriate. However, if donors channel resources to places 
where they believe it will do the most good – specifically, to countries with reliable 
environmental information, sound institutions, a good investment climate, a significant level of 
interest in environmental protection, and meaningful environmental policies – then such an   8 
outcome speaks to the question of why donors are giving money in the first place. As Connolly 
puts it, donor allocations “[set] early parameters” on the effectiveness of aid.
14 
 
The Argument in Brief 
In our view, neither the functional nor the dysfunctional aid narrative is necessarily 
wrong.  One problem with extant econometric work is that it relies on highly-aggregated data 
that obscures many of the most important stylized facts about aid allocation and effectiveness – 
these aggregated data wash out much of the meaningful variation in aid allocation patterns. By 
conflating types of aid and lumping together donors with different preferences, incentive 
structures, decision-making procedures, and capabilities, analysts have overlooked what may be 
the silver lining of the actual aid narrative – that some types of aid and some types of donors are 
less beholden to geo-strategic, commercial, and other “dysfunctional” constraints and better 
positioned to provide IPGs. In short, the existing literature on foreign aid has over-generalized its 
conclusions.  
  Foreign aid is routinely characterized as an undifferentiated mass of Western money 
flowing to corrupt and incompetent developing country governments. The implicit assumption of 
most work on aid allocation is that different types of donors respond to similar ascriptive and 
behavioral recipient characteristics.  It is also assumed that different types of aid get allocated by 
similar procedures with similar results. The perennial puzzle of aid effectiveness – whether, how, 
and to what extent the receipt of foreign aid influences development outcomes – is also fraught 
with serious theoretical and methodological problems. Careful analysts are no doubt aware that 
we should be analyzing specific types of aid and their impact on specific development outcomes, 
but instead what we have witnessed is an outpouring of econometric work on the relationship 
                                                            
14 Connolly 1996: 329.   9 
between total aid flows – including support for military expenditures, peacekeeping, landmine 
clearance, free and fair elections, civil society, bio-diversity, HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, and 
refugee movements – and causally-distant outcomes like economic growth and poverty 
alleviation.
15  These research designs cannot gauge the effect that specific types of aid have on 
their stated objectives. Aid targeting bio-diversity protection surely affects economic growth and 
infant mortality differently than road construction, electricity grids, and oil derricks, but up until 
this point scholars have had no way of subjecting such hypotheses to discriminating empirical 
tests.  
Rigorous empirical testing of hypotheses concerning the causes and consequences of IPG 
aid has proved overwhelmingly difficult because we lack systematic, reliable, and detailed data 
on the aggregate amount, sources, and destinations of aid. More importantly, we do not know the 
characteristics of individual aid projects.  Interesting and plausible hypotheses pervade the IPG 
literature, and some of these derive from well-developed theoretical propositions, but knowledge 
accumulation has been minimal since arguments have not been tested with data gathered at the 
appropriate level of analysis. Specifically, hypotheses have not been tested at the level of 
development projects.  Instead, scholars aggregate—incorrect and biased
16—sums of aid and 
loans at the sectoral or country level. 
In this paper, we hope to remedy this shortcoming by relying on a new dataset developed 
at the College of William and Mary and Brigham Young University. The project-level aid 
(PLAID) database allows analysts to identify important categories within aid sectors and 
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standardize data across different types of donors. At the sectoral level, different donors often 
classify sectors differently, making cross-donor comparisons impossible.  The independent 
coding scheme employed in the PLAID dataset standardizes such categories for all donors and 
recipients so that we can have greater confidence in our classifications of aid type.
17 
Importantly, PLAID codes specific projects based on their actual project descriptions, 
rather than assuming entire sectors are homogenous. Development agencies’ sector coding can 
be highly misleading because very different projects are often lumped under the same sector 
heading, thus offering a skewed picture of donor agencies actual spending patterns and priorities. 
For example, in the OECD database (to which all bilateral donors theoretically report), 
sustainable forestry and selective logging receive the same sector code as clear-cutting 
deforestation projects!  For scholars interested in the impact of foreign aid on the environment, 
such distinctions are vital and PLAID data highlights these differences.
18 
PLAID data also permits more accurate comparisons of multilateral and bilateral aid 
agencies.  Currently, analysts cannot determine which types of projects donors tend to delegate 
to multilaterals and which to their own bilateral agencies.
19  Extant data also cannot distinguish 
among recipients as to the specific aid they receive from multilateral and bilateral agencies 
respectively.  Such distinctions are critical if we hope to test hypotheses about the motives of 
donors to provide multilateral, rather than bilateral, aid.
20 
 
Allocation of Environmental Aid 
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After World War II, the overwhelming body of IR scholarship viewed foreign assistance 
as a quid pro quo—that is, an intergovernmental bribe.
21 The dominant principle governing aid 
allocation seemed to be “we know they are bastards, but at least they are our bastards, not 
theirs.”
22 Substantively, this meant that international financial transfers were often made for 
reasons of political loyalty, domestic politics, and national security, not their stated objectives 
(i.e. economic development, poverty reduction, public health, and education). Thus, until the end 
of the Cold War, most money flowed to strategic military locations, areas rich in natural 
resources, newly-independent colonies, and certain key trading partners.  But soon after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, analysts found that political motivation alone failed to explain new types of 
aid that closely resembled voluntary interstate cooperation.  As international financial transfers 
for collective good provision—particularly, debt relief, environmental protection, infectious 
disease control, and structural adjustment—grew more prominent within bilateral and 
multilateral portfolios, new empirical patterns began to beg new questions concerning donor (and 
recipient) motivations.  Most obviously, why had benefactors and beneficiaries moved toward 
pursuing broader shared interests that required and enhanced long-term policy coordination, 
unlike the earlier focus on more straightforward “aid-for-loyalty”—or “private good”—
transactions?  
More recent work explains this shift by characterizing foreign assistance as an act of 
international cooperation that represented mutual policy adjustment on the part of recipients and 
donors.
23  Aid, they argued, could be understood as a “contract in which funders trade 
concessional loans or grants for policy reforms in a recipient [country].”
24  Crucial too for 
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institutionalists was the presence of underlying rules, principles, norms and decision-making 
procedures to govern such resources-for-reform swaps.
25  They emphasized that states could 
reduce transaction costs and uncertainty, discourage reneging, and advance the shared interests 
and absolute gains of all parties by establishing mutually acceptable “rules of the game” that 
would stabilize expectations.  
Environmental aid transfers occurs as inter-governmental contracts that promote 
collective good provision. Donors who distribute environmental assistance are assumed to be 
genuinely interested in environmental protection. To test this assumption, before turning to any 
analytical statistics, it is worth looking at patterns in the descriptive data. If donors are indeed 
motivated by a desire to advance the cause of environmental protection, we would expect to 
observe a) an increase in environmental aid as a percentage of total aid spending and b) a 
decrease in aid that harms the environment – or “dirty” aid –as a percentage of total aid 
spending. Figures 1 and 2 confirm both of these expectations. Since “green” environmental 
issues like climate change, bio-diversity loss, deforestation and ozone depletion more closely 
resemble collective goods than “brown” issues like sanitation, soil erosion, and sewerage, which 
are more easily carved up into projects that can reward a targeted group of political supporters or 
construction contractors, we would also expect donors to distribute relatively more green aid 
than brown aid. Figures 3 and 4, again, lend support to this proposition. To explain what actually 
motivates the behavior of environmental aid donors, we must analyze how scarce aid resources 
are allocated among recipient countries.  
 
Observable Implications 
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We argue that five recipient-level (behavioral and ascriptive) characteristics promote 
successful international financial transfers for environmental protection: 
•  First, for an “efficient” environmental aid contract to be written, we argue donors and 
recipients must establish a shared interest. Their interests needn’t be naturally 
harmonious, but both parties must stand to gain from cooperation.
26 Donor and recipient 
preferences are less likely to coalesce around issues of local environmental concern since 
they often lack the characteristics of a collective good. Issues like climate change and 
bio-diversity, which yield significant benefits to both donors and recipients, require 
collective action and thus increase the probability of a stable cooperative equilibrium. We 
would therefore expect more environmental aid dollars and contracts to flow to countries 
of global environmental significance.  For example, Brazil, Tanzania and the Philippines 
should matter more to eco-functional donors than Chad or Mongolia, even when holding 
all other factors that might explain aid flows constant. 
•  Donors will target recipient countries where environmental quality is poor, ceteris 
paribus. There are no doubt a whole host of variables that condition the effectiveness of 
environmental aid – and thus a donor’s willingness to give aid – but if donors are 
genuinely interested in improving environmental protection, they will target those 
countries where they expect their aid investment to yield the highest “environmental rate-
of-return.” Furthermore, recipients experiencing high levels of environmental stress will 
have a greater interest in securing environmental aid contracts than recipients with 
relatively undamaged environmental resources. 
•  Another plausible determinant of environmental aid allocation is recipient credibility. 
Donors will be less likely to enter into aid contracts with recipients that cannot 
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convincingly demonstrate their willingness and ability to implement meaningful 
environmental reforms. As Connolly suggests, “recipient countries’ political commitment 
to environmental reforms stands out as a major explanatory factor for the success or 
failure of financial transfers.”
27 Thus, we predict that donors will reward countries based 
on the strength of their revealed environmental policy preferences.
28   
•  Also critical to a recipient’s credibility is its willingness and ability to provide donors 
with reliable information about its own behavior.
29  Transparency is an important 
determinant of inter-state cooperation because it allows demandeurs
30 to assess the 
intentions, capabilities, and past behavior of potential cooperators and thus evaluate their 
trustworthiness. Trust lubricates cooperative efforts by reducing uncertainty and 
transaction costs, enhancing the credibility of state commitments, making defection more 
costly, and promoting stable expectations. Though free-riders can certainly report false 
information, those who report less environmental information, should be viewed with 
greater suspicion and thus receive fewer environmental aid dollars and contracts. Bad 
information is better than no information because self-reporting opportunistic actors run a 
higher risk of being detected and punished by donors, particularly in an era of high 
resolution satellite, spacecraft, and aircraft imagery, which provides “objective, unbiased, 
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29 Mitchell 1998; Florini 2000; Stein 1999; Tierney 2003. 
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and transparent data sources in a near real time basis.”
31  The incentive to misrepresent 
one’s intentions, capabilities, or level of need is also weaker in transparent countries 
since government officials are aware that donors are better able to assess the credibility.
32 
•  Finally, one additional factor that might be expected to impact the a donor’s calculation 
of the “environmental rate of return” would be the economic policy and institutional 
environment of the recipient countries within which donors identify, prepare, execute, 
and maintain projects. In countries where the government regularly intervenes in markets 
and distorts pricing structures, there is a strong possibility that the selection and appraisal 
of public investment projects will also be distorted. For example, in countries where 
excess demand has been artificially generated, donors may select inappropriate 
investments and overestimate the “optimum attainable output capacity” of their 
projects.
33 Where trade, investment, and exchange rate restrictions are high, crucial 
project inputs may be prohibitively expensive or entirely unavailable.
34 Local firms 
seeking to provide complementary environmental goods and services will also do so 
more efficiently in the absence of state controls on capital goods and other imported 
inputs. As Raustiala and Victor note, “When domestic regulatory and market institutions 
are poorly developed, it is especially difficult for recipients to assure donors that financial 
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transfers will be spent as intended.”
35 Hence, we expect that donors will reward recipient 
governments with “sound” economic policies, ceteris paribus.
36 
 
The Empirical Aid Allocation Model 
The allocation of foreign aid has been studied empirically with respect how donor 
preferences and recipient characteristics affect foreign aid allocation (Burnside and Dollar; 
Neumeyer).  The goal of the empirical puzzle is to examine how donor countries allocate their 
environmental aid and to examine if their allocation rule depends in part on environmental, 
economic, or political factors in the recipient country.   
The patterns of environmental aid for the years reveals that a significant proportion of 
countries receive no environmental aid for a given period while others receive large amounts of 
aid.  This pattern of aid allocation lends itself empirically to thinking about aid allocation as a 
two step process.  In the so-called gatekeeping stage, a donor country decides whether to give a 
recipient country some positive amount of aid.  Once a recipient country has passed the 
gatekeeping stage, the donor country then allocates a portion of their overall aid budget to the 
recipient country in what is called the allocation stage.  Consequently, when one asks how do 
donor preferences and recipient characteristics affect aid allocation, one needs to think about 
how both of these factors affect the gatekeeping and allocation stage of the donor process.   
The two stage process described above is more an artifact for how we treat zeros in the 
empirical model.  Since a significant portion of recipient countries receive no aid, then the 
                                                            
35 Raustiala and Victor 1998: 675. Roginko (1998: 604), somewhat tangentially, argues that more environmental aid 
flows to goes to Russia than other Baltic states because of the “greater political and economic stability in the Baltic 
countries compared with the situation in Russia. Furthermore, enterprise and municipal facilities in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania are better positioned to purchase foreign technology because their domestic currencies are 
convertible.” 
36 Of course, this logic holds for many types of aid, not just environmental aid.  Hence, if our expectations are 
confirmed here we would explore the generalizability of this tendency.   17 
probability distribution of aid exists only in the non-negative range, with a probability mass at 
zero.  We estimate this two-stage process using a Cragg Model- in an aid context, a country will 
only give aid to a donor if some “hurdle” is overcome.  Once the hurdle is overcome, a positive 
amount of aid is determined.  To motivate the model, let the probability of observing no aid 
being given (y=0) be written as 
 
(1) 
) Normal(   Log ~ ) , | y ( E
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where Φ(
.) is the standard normal CDF. 
It is important to note that unlike the Tobit Model, the Cragg Model does not restrict 
explanatory variables to necessarily be the same, nor does it require that the marginal effects to 
be the same across the gatekeeping and quantity portions of the model.  A drawback of the Cragg 
Model is that there is no formal linkage between the gatekeeping and allocation stages of the 
models.  In an aid allocation context, this model is preferred to the Heckman, since it is widely 
argued (and professed by donors) that the same factors influence the gatekeeping and the amount 
stages of allocation.  If there is no readily available set of exclusionary variables then it is likely 
that the inverse Mills ration that enters the allocation equation will be highly collinear with the 
other explanatory variables.  If this happens, then identification may not be possible or even if 
we can identify the parameter, there will be little chance of estimating parameters with much 
precision. Wooldridge further points out that even if we do estimate the parameters with some 
precision it is difficult to discern whether it is because of sample selection or misspecification of 
the functional form of the model. 
 
Further Complications   18 
In the data we have collected on foreign environmental aid, we have a three-way panel of 
observation.  We have information on donor pairs (donor-recipient) and we have multiple time 
periods from which to observe donor pair patterns of aid allocation.  The implication of this data 
structure is that a donor (such as the United States) will appear in many donor pairs.  Some 
systematic factor associated with the donor pair may influence the total amount of aid that all 
recipients receive from the United States.  Hence treating our panel dataset as independently and 
identically drawn observations is likely throwing away important information.  In this paper, 
there are only 9 observations per donor-recipient pair for the gatekeeping equation and likely far 
fewer in the observations in the amount equation (since it is unlikely that every donor-recipient-
year combination will receive positive amounts of aid).  Consequently, in all of our estimations, 
we did not employ a full-blown panel estimator, but rather allowed the error structure to be 
correlated amongst recipient country observations and use robust (with respect to 
heteroskedasticity) standard errors. 
  In what follows we operationalize the various factors that may influence allocation of aid 
into five categories: 1) recipient need, 2) recipient environmental need, 3) recipient 
environmental policy, 4) recipient government institutions, 5) recipient economic policy.   In the 
gatekeeping model, define gateijy=1 if a positive amount of aid was given by donor i to recipient j 
in year y.  Otherwise, gateijy=0.  We model the gatekeeping stage using a probit model as 
follows: 
 
ijy 1 jy 6 1 jy 5 1 jy 4
j 3 1 jy 2 1 jy 1 ij ijy
fdi * ess effectiven government * ting citesrepor *
italindex naturalcap * ns eremmissio organicwat * population / gdp * gate
ε + α + α + α
+ α + α + α + α =
− − −
− −
   19 
where the gdp/population is gross domestic product (measured in PPP) divided by population 
[capturing recipient need], organic water emissions is the amount of organic water pollutants 
emitted per worker [capturing environmental need], natural capital index is a measure of the 
level of natural capital existing in a country [capturing environmental need], cites reporting is the 
percentage of cites reporting requirements met by the country [capturing environmental policy], 
government effectiveness [government institutions] , and the level of foreign direct investment 
(fdi) [economic policy].
37   
The amount equation uses the same variables.  The share of total environmental aid that a donor 
country i gives to recipient j in year y (SH_ENVijy) is modeled as  
 
( )
ijy 1 jy 6 1 jy 5 1 jy 4
j 3 1 jy 2 1 jy 1 ij ijy
fdi * ess effectiven government * ting citesrepor *
italindex naturalcap * ns eremmissio organicwat * population / gdp * ENV _ SH ln
ε + α + α + α
+ α + α + α + α =
− − −
− −
     
where the dependent variable, ln(SH_ENV), represents the share of the total environmental aid 
budget given by donor j captured by a recipient j in year y. We perform the same procedure for 
the dependent variables for other aid sectors- “non-environmental,” and “green,”  
These data are taken from the project-level aid (PLAID) database, which codes more than 
400,000 individual aid projects between the period 1970 and 2002 – approximately 90 percent of 
the entire development assistance universe – on a 5-point scale, ranging from strictly-defined 
environmental projects (ESD) to strictly-defined dirty projects (DSD).
38 Projects are also 
classified as broadly-defined environmental (EBD), broadly-defined dirty (DBD), or 
                                                            
37 For each category, we have tried running the models with the substitute variables listed in Table 1.  Our results are 
remarkably robust across these measures. We expect that as this paper matures more of these comparisons will be 
included.  We will also add a sixth category- geo-strategic variables such as human rights violations, two-way trade, 
and former colony dummies. 
38 All these data are from the e-PLAID I database.  Schultz et al. 2004.   20 
environmentally neutral (N).
39  From cleanest to dirtiest, then, the ordinal scale runs: ESD, EBD, 
N, DBD, DSD. In the models reported below, we measure environmental aid as the sum of ESD 
and EBD. Likewise, we take dirty aid to equal the sum of DSD and DBD. Any project that 
received an ESD or EBD designation was also coded as either green or brown.
40 This second 
coding scheme seems to capture the “collective good” vs. “private good” distinction discussed 
earlier. General coding criteria are provided in Tables 10 and 11. 
On the right-hand side of the equation, we introduce GDP per capita, as a control variable. 
Extant econometric work on aid allocation suggests that both of these variables routinely emerge 
as significant across multiple specifications of donor allocation models. This variable, which we 
use as a proxy for “recipient need,” should drive allocation decisions.  We hypothesize that 
donors will allocate a larger share of a given aid budget to more needy countries.  There is wide 
agreement among aid analysts that donors are sensitive to human development needs, regardless 
of the specific type of aid they seek to distribute. We expect these relationships to hold across 
both the environmental and green models we resent below.  
The amount of “natural capital” that a country possesses is intended to capture the global 
environmental significance of a recipient. We expect that countries with more natural capital will 
be more likely to establish a shared interest with donors and thus secure more environmental aid 
contracts and dollars. This relationship, we predict, will be positive and significant in the 
environmental aid share estimation, and stronger for green aid. The Natural Capital Index (NCI) 
                                                            
39 Any foreign aid project which, according to its project description, could be characterized as beneficial toward the 
natural environment, by both intent and consequence, is classified as environmental.  This included both green 
projects, dealing with issues such as global warming and biodiversity, and brown projects, dealing with issues such 
as water supply and sewerage. Any foreign aid project that is likely to have a detrimental impact on the natural 
environment is classified as dirty.  Projects that appeared unlikely to affect the environment in a significant way 
were coded as neutral. 
40 Green projects deal with global environmental problems, such as climate change, deforestation, and biodiversity, 
while Brown projects deal mostly with local environmental problems, like sanitation, soil erosion, and sewerage.  
The criteria were extremely specific, so that coders did not have to make judgment calls about different projects.     21 
comes from Rodenburg et al.
41  Nations scoring high have larger land areas, more valuable 
natural species diversity, and resources.  The formula used to calculate the NCI multiplies 
remaining natural areas (including water territory) by a biodiversity indicator.  Remaining 
natural areas are obtained by subtracting commercial lands from total national territory, and the 
biodiversity indicator divides the total number of species in a country by the average number of 
species for a country with a given territory.  We also employ organic water pollutant emissions 
per worker as a measure of environmental need, which should factor into the “shared interest” 
calculation for both donors and recipients as well. 
  As a proxy for the credibility of a recipient’s environmental policy commitments, we use 
the percentage of CITES reporting requirements met by the recipient country.  This measure is 
intended to capture the extent of environmental policy (and attention devoted to environmental 
issues) in a recipient county.  We would expect that donors more concerned with effectiveness of 
their environmental aid will be more concerned with the environmental policy in a country.  
Further, we expect a stronger effect in the green model. The final variables we introduce are 
intended to capture the economic policy and political institutions of the recipient country.  We 
expect that all other things equal, a country with better economic policy or government 
institutions will tend to increase the share of aid they receive from a donor country.  Our 
measures are also analytically similar to those employed by Burnside and Dollar, who conclude 
that “poor countries with sound economic policies benefit directly from [such] policies… 
[because] aid is [not] dissipated in unproductive government expenditure.”
42  
  Any empirical work in the international development is plagued by missing data 
problems.  In estimating our models, we have chosen independent variables that balance 
                                                            
41 Rodenburg et al. 1995. 
42 Burnside and Dollar 2000: 847. The World Bank (1998: 13) also takes the position that “there is no value in 
providing large amounts of money to a country with poor policies.”    22 
tradeoffs associated with maximum coverage versus capturing the effect we believe is important 
in describing the allocation of environmental aid.  For all of the models presented here, and for 
additional models not presented, we have estimated using listwise deletion (deleting observations 
that have missing data for any of the independent variables and using Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo simulation methods to impute missing data (for details, see Schafer).   We believe that the 
imputation method we use provides more complete data coverage and provides a better picture of 
aid allocation.  Table 1 provides a comprehensive list of variables by category that we are 
actively pursuing. 
Results 
 The results presented in this section are preliminary and subject to change.  The reader should  
note that we are actively working on these models.    Table 2 presents the results for both 
environmental and green aid for the aggregate bilateral and multilateral donor groups. 
43 Note 
that for all models, whether green or environmental, donors respond to recipient need, 
irrespective of a countries environmental need even when allocating environmental aid.  
However, we see a consistent pattern- donors respond to need in the gatekeeping stage.  Higher 
pollution levels and a higher level of natural capital increases the probability that a recipient 
country receives a positive share of a donors aid.  Better environmental policy (as evidenced by 
the CITES reporting parameter) also increases the probability of a positive share.  As for the 
amount equation, multilaterals tend to respond to higher natural capital scores, and given that a 
country has reached a minimum level of need, tends to target those countries having less 
pollution problems.  Multilaterals also respond to government institutions and economic policy 
in ways that we hypothesized.  A notable result following from arguments earlier in the paper is 
                                                            
43 We have also estimated donor-specific models that will be reported in later versions of this paper.   23 
that bilateral donors become increasingly responsive to environmental and political institutions 
when allocating IPG (Green) projects. 
  Table 3, presents the results when examining allocation patterns across two groups of 
multilaterals, those whose primary mission deals with public goods (termed MGA for 
multilateral granting agencies consisting of the Global Environmental Facility, the European 
Development Fund, the EU Fund for Central European Countries, the Montreal Protocol Fund, 
and development aid from UN Agencies) and those that provide a wide mix of projects (termed 
MDB for multilateral development banks consisting of the remainder of multilateral lending 
institutions).  In the selection stage, all provide dollars to countries with higher natural capital 
scores, while MDB’s target countries with less pollution per worker and MGA’s tend to target 
countries with more pollution per worker.   For both sets of ‘green’ results in the amount 
equation, we see that government effectiveness plays an important role in the allocation of aid 
money. 
  From both sets of results some generalizations can be drawn.  First, when moving from 
environmental projects to the smaller subset of environmental projects having global or regional 
significance (GREEN), government effectiveness and economic policy- those factors likely 
influencing the effectiveness of the project- become increasingly important.   Additionally, 
multilaterals are more responsive to environmental need than bilateral donors.  Not surprisingly, 
this trend seems to be being driven largely from the MGA institutions.      
Conclusions 
We still have some work left to finalize the models.  Beyond the addition of several more 
independent variables, we plan on testing for homogeneity of donor preferences and will be 
moving more toward donor-specific models of allocation.  Further, we intend to test for   24 
differences across types of aid, to see if environmental or green aid allocation is fundamentally 
different (with respect to the revealed preference of past donor aid patterns) than other types of 
aid. 
  Despite the apparent limitations of what we have so far, we already can see several 
interesting policy implications.   First, for a citizen in a donor country that is really interested in 
providing money for effective environmental projects, whether they have global significance or 
not, it is better for their country to channel aid through the specialized multilateral granting 
agencies (like the Global Environmental Facility).  Not only do this institutions target need but 
they target need selectively.    
   For recipients, regardless of whether money is coming from bilateral or multilateral 
institutions, having sound environmental, economic, and government institutions pays off with 
respect to getting larger shares of the foreign aid budget.  Having a demonstrated, albeit not dire, 
environmental need leads to a larger share of donors’ aid budgets.  25 
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Figure 1.  
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Figure 3.  
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Figure 5. 
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GDPPPP GDP measured in PPP Global Development Network (GDN) database
GNI PERCAP GNI per capita World Bank World Development Indicators
IMR Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births Global Development Network (GDN) database
POPULATION Total population Global Development Network (GDN) database
Environmental Policy:
EPI Environmental Policy Index (EPI) score, measuring  Nielson and Tierney (year)
   environmental policy of a country : 1 (greatest environmental 
   policy), 0 (least environmental policy)
CFC PRODUCTION CFC production (in ODP tons, i.e. Metric Tons x Ozone  World Resources Institute (WRI)
   Depletion Potential)
CITES REPORTING Percent of CITES reporting requirements met  World Resources Institute (WRI)
Econ Policy:
TRADE OPEN Trade Openness index score: imports + exports/GDP Global Development Network (GDN) database
PROP RIGHTS Property Rights index score: 1 (high property rights), 5  Heritage Foundation
   (low property rights)
FDI Foreign Investment index score: 1 (most foreign investment, 5 (least foreign investment) Heritage Foundation
TRADE GDP Total trade: (imports+exports) (% of GDP) Global Development Network (GDN) database
Environmental Need:
SCORE Natural Capital Score: 1225 (most natural capital), 0 (least  World Bank
   natural capital)
EWI Ecosystem Wellbeing Index (EWI) score: 100 (maximum), Ecosystem Wellbeing Index (EWI)
   0 (minimum)
NAT BIODEV INDEX National Biodiversity Index score. Based on estimates of  UNEP-WMC
   country richness and endemism in four terrestrial vertebrate 
   classes and vascular plants; vertebrates and plants are ranked 
   equally; index values range between 1.000 (maximum) and 
   0.000 (minimum). The NBI includes some adjustment 
   allowing for country size. Countries with land area less than 
   5,000 sq km are excluded
ORG WATER EMIT Organic water pollution intensity indicator, measured as kilograms Wordl Bank World Development Indicators
   of organic water pollutant (determined by bacterial biochemical
   oxygen demand) emissions per day per worker
FERTILIZER USE Fertilizer use intensity (Fertilizer kilograms per hectare) World Resources Institute (WRI)
LAND USE Percent of land affected by agriculture World Resources Institute (WRI)
TOTAL FOREST AREA Total forest area in hectares World Resources Institute (WRI)
Institutions:
PRESS INDEX Press freedom data are collected by Freedom House. The final  Freedom House
   index is a scale rating from 100 (free press) to 0 (highly
   controlled press)
CONTROL CORRUPT Corruption in government score: 60 (low corruption), 0 (high  The IRIS Dataset
   corruption)
DEMOC Institutionalized Democracy: 10 (democracy), 0 (nondemocracy) POLITY IV
POLCONV 2002 Political Constraint Index (POLCON), plus two additional The Political Constraint Index 
   veto points (the judiciary and sub_federal entities): 1 (low 
   constraint), 0 (high constraint)
CIVIL LIBERTIES Freedom House Index of Civil Liberties: 7 (low civil liberties), 0 Freedom House
   (high civil liberties)
GOVT EFFECTIV Government Effectiveness Estimate: 2.5 (highly effective),  Governance Matters Database
   -2.5 (highly ineffective)
REGULATORY QUAL Regulatory Quality Estimate:-2.5 (extremely poor record), 2.5  Governance Matters Database
TABLE 1—DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND SOURCES
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Table 2: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Environmental and Green Aid 
Selection Equation 
  ENV  GREEN 
Variable Name  Bilat  Multilat  BILAT  MULTILAT 
























































N  25557  14391  25557  14391 
Amount Equation 
























































N  4418  1545  1705  1066 
* significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level 
t statistics in parenthesis   42 
Table 3: A Comparison of Multilateral Development Banks and Grant Agencies 
Selection Equation 
  ENV  GREEN 
Variable Name  MDB  MGA  MDB  MGA 
























































N  9963  4428  9963  4428 
Amount Equation 
























































N  484  1061  122  944 
* significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level 
t statistics in parenthesis 
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TABLE 4: AIDTYPE VALUES AND GENERAL CRITERIA 
Values   General Criteria  
Environmental Strictly Defined (ESD)  —Considered environmental aid in preponderance of 
literature 
—Description suggests that aid is intended as “green” 
aid 
Environmental Broadly Defined (EBD)  —Considered environmental aid in some of the 
literature 
—Significant environmental benefits despite not being 
intended as “green” aid 
Dirty Strictly Defined (DSD)  —Project description contains explicitly dirty elements 
Dirty Broadly Defined (DBD)  —Project not explicitly dirty, but supports an 
empirically dirty sector 
—Project harms environment, but not enough to 
classify as DSD 




TABLE 5: ENVAIDTYPE VALUES AND GENERAL CRITERIA 
Values  Broad Criteria 
Green  —Environmental benefits of the project are regional or global 
Brown  —Benefits accrue primarily to recipient  
 